Intimate Partner Violence Claims: What the New Tort Means for Insurers

Summary

In the recent decision of Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16 (“Ahluwalia”), the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) recognized a new common law tort of intimate partner violence. The tort is designed to address the distinct wrong associated with coercive control in an intimate partner relationship and the corresponding deprivation of a survivor’s dignity, equality, and autonomy.

Ahluwalia is a claim arising from a matrimonial breakdown and not an insurance coverage dispute. Nonetheless, the recognition of the new tort, which contemplates a broad range of conduct that may qualify as coercive control, is of importance to insurers. Defendants in claims advanced pursuant to the new tort are expected to seek coverage from the liability sections of their domestic property policies. Express exclusions in the subject policy wording, as well as the common law requirement that insurance applies only to fortuitous acts, may be engaged to limit or deny coverage entirely.

Background

In Ahluwalia, Mr. Ahluwalia was found to have subjected Mrs. Ahluwalia to a pattern of abuse over the course of their 16-year marriage, which included physical violence, emotional abuse, financial control, and isolation. At trial, the judge concluded that existing torts did not adequately capture the cumulative harm caused by Mr. Ahluwalia, nor the “long-term, harmful patterns of conduct that are designed to control or terrorize.” Accordingly, the trial judge concluded that a novel tort of family violence ought to be recognized. Mrs. Ahluwalia was awarded $150,000, comprised of $50,000 in compensatory damages to compensate for harm that flowed from family violence, $50,000 in aggravated damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages.

On appeal, Mr. Ahluwalia admitted that his abusive conduct gave rise to liability under the existing torts of assault, battery, and intentional inflection of emotional distress. However, he submitted that damages should be reduced on the basis that the award was excessive and only damages under existing torts ought to be granted. The Court of Appeal agreed and allowed the appeal in part. The damages awarded to Mrs. Ahluwalia were reduced by $50,000. In rendering its decision, the Court of Appeal found that existing torts provided an adequate remedy for the claim and declared that a new tort of family violence should not be recognized.

The SCC disagreed with the decision rendered by the Court of Appeal. It held that the requisite elements for recognizing a novel tort were met and that the Court of Appeal erred by:

1. failing to recognize that the core feature of the claim was coercive control; and
2. stretching existing torts beyond their doctrinal limits rather than recognizing a new tort.

The SCC also noted that coercive control results in entirely different harm from that contemplated by existing torts, namely the deprivation of a survivor’s dignity, equality, and autonomy.

Tort of Intimate Partner Violence

There are three elements that must be established for a claim for damages arising from intimate partner violence to be successful. Those elements are:

1. the abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath;
2. the defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct; and
3. the conduct, on an objective measure, constituted coercive control.

To establish the second element, the plaintiff needs only to prove that a defendant intended to engage in the impugned conduct. There is not requirement to prove the defendant subjectively intended to control or coerce the plaintiff.

Once the three elements are established, harm is presumed to flow from the wrongful conduct. The plaintiff is not required to separately prove consequential harm.

Coercive Control

Coercive control is conduct that serves to control, isolate, or entrap a victim. While in Ahluwalia, there was evidence of coercive control over the course of a 16-year marriage, the SCC specifically noted that single wrongful acts are not excluded simply because they do not occur over a long-period of time. A single incident of physical violence or another form of abuse may have the same effect on a plaintiff regardless of the temporal period.

The SCC provided the following examples of conduct that constitutes coercive control:

• emotional and psychological abuse, including verbal abuse;
• harassment, humiliation, and denigration;
• financial control, stalking, and surveillance;
• behaviour that isolates a partner from others, or that denies a partner access to educational, employment, and recreational opportunities;
• litigation abuse; and
• threatening conduct, including threatening to harm the children or take them away, and threatening to commit suicide.

This non-exhaustive list highlights that the tort is meant to cover all potential forms of abuse that may arise during an intimate partner relationship. However, there are limits to what constitutes coercive control as noted by the SCC, where they wrote:

The trial judge must determine whether a reasonable person, fully apprised of the relevant context of the relationship, would have perceived the defendant’s acts, considered cumulatively, as amounting to an assertion of control over the plaintiff that has the effect of depriving them of their dignity, autonomy, and equality in the relationship.

Ultimately, this broad and context-driven approach to coercive control introduces a degree of uncertainty in its application. This uncertainty is particularly pronounced in the insurance context, where the characterization of the conduct, paired with how it is pled, may determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend.

Duty to Defend

Insurers can expect to see courts address coverage disputes arising from claims for intimate partner violence over the next year or two. The law in Canada is clear that an insurer’s duty to defend arises where there is a “mere possibility” that a claim falls within coverage: Progressive Homes Ltd v. Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada, 2010 SCC 33 (“Progressive Homes”). This is commonly known as the “pleadings rule”: the pleadings govern the duty to defend; not the insurer’s view of the validity of the claim. If the claim alleges a state of facts which, if proven, would fall within the coverage of the policy, then the insurer is obligated to defend the claim regardless of the truth or falsity of such allegations. If the allegations do not come within the policy, then the insurer has no duty to defend: Monenco Ltd. v. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 2001 SCC 49.

In Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd's of London v. Scalera, 2000 SCC 24 (“Scalera”), the SCC held that bare assertions in a Statement of Claim are not necessarily determinative: “what really matters is not the labels used by the plaintiff, but the true nature of the claim”. This requires courts to determine the substance of what is actually claimed (i.e. is an intentional tort disguised as a claim in negligence?), determine whether any claims are entirely derivative of an intentional (excluded) tort, and determine whether any properly pleaded, non-derivative claims could trigger a duty to defend.

Home insurance policies typically exclude coverage for claims made by persons who live with the insured. They also exclude coverage for intentional acts, which dovetails with the common law prohibitions against insurance coverage for non-fortuitous acts. We anticipate that these will be the primary grounds for insurance coverage litigation arising from intimate partner violence claims.

While nascent in their judicial and practical development, intimate partner violence claims capture a wide range of impugned conduct. There are obvious examples of such claims where the conduct is intended to cause harm to others. However, as the law develops and nuanced fact situations arise, there may be instances in which the underlying facts pled engage a claim for intimate partner violence, but may escape the application of intentional acts exclusions, at least at the duty to defend stage.

For occurrence based liability policies, like homeowner policies, there may be broader coverage issues arising from whether an insured properly disclosed risks of such claims in applying for a policy, or reported occurrences of intimate partner violence, or whether such claims may be a loss in progress that precludes coverage from a subsequently issued policy.

It may be that insurers will bring greater certainty to their coverage commitments by including express exclusions for intimate partner violence claims going forward.

Ultimately, coverage obligations in response to intimate partner violence claims will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the totality of the pleadings, a determination of their “true substance”, a consideration of whether any claims are entirely derivative of intentional torts, and a careful review of the subject policy terms. While there are obvious examples of fact scenarios in which intimate partner violence claims will be excluded from typical home owner policies, absolute statements about whether there may ever be coverage for intimate partner violence claims cannot be made given the broad nature of the tort and the circumstances which may be found to constitute coercive control.

Takeaway

For the public and the legal profession, Ahluwalia addresses a gap in the law by recognizing coercive control in intimate partner relationships as a distinct and actionable wrong.

For insurers, however, the decision introduces uncertainty. Given the breadth of the new tort, a duty to defend may be triggered. Whether indemnity will ultimately be required will depend on how courts interpret policy exclusions in future cases.

As coverage litigation develops, greater clarity will emerge. For now, insurers should proceed with caution when assessing claims involving allegations of coercive control and intimate partner violence.